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This paper provides a brief introduction to the recent history of, as well as the 
legal and policy framework for, local government in South Africa. It discusses the 
transformation of local government from a racially configured, illegitimate arm of 
the apartheid government into a system designed to produce developmentally 
oriented municipalities. The progress made by South African municipalities 
towards realising the vision of developmental local government is remarkable and 
unprecedented. Over the last 13 years, municipalities have embarked on the 
extension of infrastructure and development, whilst absorbing fundamental 
changes to their internal governance and management arrangements, financial 
management systems and intergovernmental responsibilities. The new local 
government system offers great potential for the realisation of a better life for all 
citizens, facilitated by a new generation of municipalities. However, the challenges 
remain huge and some of these can be attributed to institutional fault lines. These 
include challenges that come with large, inclusive municipalities, new executive 
systems and the political appointment of senior officials. The paper also identifies 
the downside of overzealous institutionalisation of community participation. With 
regard to intergovernmental relations, the paper highlights the need for a clearer 
definition of local government mandates and a greater recognition of the role of 
big cities. The current insistence on comprehensive intergovernmental alignment of 
policies and budgets is questioned, and suggestions are made to substitute this with 
an approach of selective alignment around key national priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Thirteen years since the advent of democracy and seven years into the operation of 
an entirely new local government dispensation, local government in South Africa is 
in a critical phase. On the one hand, local government has not only survived a 
fundamental restructuring but has also made great strides towards extending 
service delivery and development to marginalised communities. In thirteen years, 
local government has emerged from being an institution that was subservient, racist 
and illegitimate to an institution with democratically elected leadership, 
constitutional status and a developmental agenda. On the other hand, as 
expectations of local government service delivery, quite correctly, have risen, it has 
become evident that the broader transformation of local government is by no means 
complete.  
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a brief introduction to the 
recent history of, as well as the legal and policy framework for, local government 
in South Africa. Secondly, it examines some fault lines in the design and 
functioning of the system of local government, focusing on the national 
institutional and policy framework. Where possible, suggestions are made for a 
change of direction. It is hoped that this discussion of the local government 
framework, as well as some of its major challenges, may make a positive 
contribution to the search for avenues of improvement. 
 
The areas of concern highlighted in this paper are located in the practice of internal 
municipal governance, the functionality of current intergovernmental arrangements 
with regards to big cities, and the feasibility of the intergovernmental planning 
framework. However, before these areas of concern are traversed, a brief history 
and introduction into the main tenets of the local government framework follows. 
 
2. History of Local Government 
Local Government Pre-1994 
Before 1994, no single, uniform system of local government existed across the 
country: each province had its own configuration of local government institutions. 
Local government as an institution of governance was subservient, racist and 
illegitimate. The subservience of local government was manifest in that local 
authorities existed in terms of provincial laws, and in that their powers and 
functions were dependent on and curtailed by those laws. The development of 
separate local authorities for separated racial groups, under the leading theme of 
‘own management for own areas’, produced a clever scheme of naked exploitation 
on the basis of race. Without exception, the well-resourced and viable commercial 
centres with their strong revenue bases were reserved as white areas. The outlying 
and poor areas without meaningful formal economies were reserved for black 
people. In the homeland areas, traditional authorities were tasked with performing 
local government functions. Transformation of local government into a fully-
fledged and non-racial institution of governance was thus impelled by a legacy of 
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an “urban economic logic that systematically favoured white urban areas at the cost 
of black urban and peri-urban areas,” with “tragic and absurd” results.1  
 
Negotiations on local government between the apartheid government and the 
liberation movements commenced in earnest in the beginning of the 1990s. They 
produced a foundation for local government transformation. Essential to the 
outcome was the adoption of the principle of ‘one city one tax base’, the slogan 
with which the grossly inequitable distribution of resources was opposed by the 
liberation movement. Furthermore, a chapter on local government for the Interim 
Constitution was agreed upon, as well as a transition Act (the Local Government 
Transition Act of 1993) to guide the transformation towards democratic local 
government. 
 
Local Government Transformation 
The Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993) paved 
the way for the first democratic elections in 1994 and for the formulation of a final 
Constitution by the newly elected Parliament. It ushered in constitutional 
recognition for local government by recognising its autonomy and guaranteeing it 
revenue generating powers, as well as a right to a share of nationally generated 
revenue. The Interim Constitution set the scene for the amalgamation of over 1000 
racially defined and disparate local government structures into 842 transitional 
local authorities (Steytler 2006:187). 
 
The final Constitution of 1996 then contained a definitive statement on local 
government, in the form of a progressive chapter in which local government is 
firmly established as a mature sphere of government. Furthermore, the Constitution 
posited local government as a critical development agent by listing the 
‘constitutional objects’ and ‘developmental duties’ of local government. These 
centre around democracy, sustainable service delivery, social and economic 
development, environmental protection, community participation, poverty 
alleviation and intergovernmental cooperation (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1993, ss 152 and 152). 
 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (Department of Constitutional 
Development 1998) preceded the implementation of the constitutional provisions. 
It proved to be a policy that rallied friend and foe around new concepts. It 
introduced a discourse that would reverberate until long afterwards. It translated 
the constitutional objects and duties into the concept of ‘developmental local 
government’, and defined the new mandate as “local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to 
meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their 
lives.” Developmental local government would be characterised by four features.  
 
                                                
1
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
and Others 1998 (2) BLCR 1458 (CC), para 122.
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• Maximising economic growth and social development: local government is 
instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a 
maximum impact on economic growth and social development of 
communities. 
• Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and coordinates 
developmental activities of other state and non-state agents in the 
municipal area. 
• Democratic development and public participation: local government 
becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of 
the kind of place in which they wish to live. 
• Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, stimulate 
the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, and stimulate 
local political leadership. 
 
The transformation of local government institutions began in earnest with the 
adoption in 1998 of the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, providing 
for the demarcation of municipal boundaries by an independent Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB). The Constitution contains the imperative of creating a 
‘wall-to-wall’ system of inclusive and viable municipalities (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(1)). This represented a break with the past 
where not all areas, particularly traditional rural areas, were governed by a local 
authority. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 provided a 
legal framework for the establishment of local government institutions. It 
established two modes of local government: single-tiered metropolitan 
municipalities in large urban areas, and a two-tiered system of district and local 
municipalities throughout the rest of the country. It further provided a framework 
for the internal functioning of municipalities. Critical new aspects were the 
introduction of firstly, an ‘executive mayor’ system of municipal governance 
alongside the classic ‘collective executive committee’ system; secondly, a separate 
municipal speaker; and thirdly, ward committees as vehicles for community 
participation. The impact and success of these changes is discussed below.  
 
On 5 December 2000, municipal councils were elected into this new system of 
local government. A new generation of municipalities thus commenced their 
journey towards realising the constitutional vision of developmental local 
government.  
 
In the meantime, transformation work had continued with the adoption in 2000 of 
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. This Act represents a detailed 
definition of developmental local government as espoused in the White Paper on 
Local Government. It engages the developmental vision of municipalities working 
together with citizens by establishing a framework that instructs municipalities to 
involve citizens in decision making, particularly through the regulation of a 
framework for participative development planning. 
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In 2003, the institutional and developmental chapters of local government 
transformation were complemented by a financial chapter. The Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 establishes a robust framework for 
local government finance, dealing with financial management and accounting, 
revenue, expenditure and debt management, responsibilities of accounting officers 
and mayors, and financial supervision by national and provincial governments. The 
Act was widely welcomed as a long awaited and necessary framework and 
financial management tool for municipalities. 
 
3. Local Government’s Record of Delivery 
Before venturing into a critical analysis of the progress achieved to date with 
regard to local government transformation, it is important to recall some of the key 
benefits to be had from engaging local government in development and service 
delivery (De Visser 2005:19). Firstly, local government is the level of government 
that is closest to the citizens. At least in theory, municipalities are best able to 
obtain and understand people’s wishes and aspirations for the locality. They should 
also be best placed to identify and unlock local potential, and mobilise resources 
present in the locality. These characteristics do not automatically lead to a higher 
quality and legitimacy of decisions but certainly have the potential to do so. This 
depends on whether local governments are indeed configured and behave 
responsively, and to what extent local governments are able to pursue their 
communities’ wishes for the locality through broader government structures and 
partnerships.  
 
Secondly, there is the promise that local government holds for deepening 
democracy: having many sites of democratic practice is fertile ground for the 
growth of new leadership and the consolidation of multi-party democracy. Thirdly, 
the allocation of responsibility to municipalities creates room for local creativity 
and avoids the phenomenon where the entire country needs to experience the same 
experiment before it can be evaluated. Fourthly, municipalities are key players in 
multi-sectoral coordination as they are the witnesses of the actual delivery by all 
development actors on the ground. 
 
Against this background, a broad assessment of progress to date indicates an 
impressive record of expansion of service delivery. Through the leadership of 
municipalities, basic service delivery has been extended to the marginalised to a 
degree that is unprecedented in South Africa’s history, and at a pace that is noted 
and commended internationally. Access to water supply increased from 59% of 
total households in 1994 to 86% by April 2007. Access to sanitation increased from 
48% to 73% over the same period. In 1994, 30% of houses in South Africa had 
access to electricity, but by 2006/07 this figure had increased to 73%. From 1994 to 
2006 a total of 2,243 million houses were delivered at an average of 249,290 units 
per annum (Department of Provincial and Local Government 2007:5). 
 
However, the incomplete and, in certain respects, imperfect nature of local 
government transformation is evidenced by social protests that emerged most 
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intensively during 2005 and 2006 and continued in 2007. Protests revolved around 
poor records of service delivery, real and perceived instances of corruption, and a 
lack of developmental impact by municipalities (Atkinson 2007:58). 
 
It is also relevant to note that whilst municipal political leadership in South Africa 
is democratically elected under a national electoral system, voter turnout over the 
last three local government elections has not been impressive, averaging around 
48% (Independent Electoral Commission 2006; Human Sciences Research Council 
2006:3). Negative sentiments that contribute to a lower turnout for local than for 
national and provincial elections relate mainly to a lack of interest and trust in local 
government (Good Governance Learning Network 2008:34) 
 
It is argued here that certain fault lines in the design of the local government 
system may have contributed to this negative sentiment and the groundswell of 
protest against municipalities. These fault lines relate to some of the key elements 
of the legal and policy framework for local government. 
 
4. Central Tenets of the System 
The Constitution terms each sphere of government ‘distinctive, interrelated and 
interdependent’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 40(1)). These 
three labels define the values underlying South Africa’s system of 
intergovernmental relations. The status of local government in the South African 
system of government can be explained by making use of this constitutional 
terminology. 
 
Local government’s ‘distinctiveness’ as a sphere of government manifests itself in 
a number of ways. Firstly, municipalities are headed by democratically elected 
councils (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 157(1)). The 
electoral framework, laid down in the Constitution, the Municipal Structures Act 
and the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act of 2000, provides that 
municipal councils generally comprise 50% ward councillors, elected on a ‘winner 
takes all’ constituency system, and 50% councillors elected via a party list 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 20). 
 
The second manifestation of the ‘distinctiveness’ of local government is the fact 
that the Constitution itself allocates ‘original’ powers and functions to 
municipalities. It does this by providing a list of ‘local government matters’ over 
which local government has authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1993, s. 156).2 Additional powers and functions can be transferred by national and 
provincial governments to local government as a sphere, or to individual 
municipalities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 156(2)). 
 
Furthermore, a significant part of local government’s financial authority is 
guaranteed through constitutional provisions that secure local government’s power 
                                                
2
 Read with Schedules 4A and 5B of the Constitution. 
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to levy property rates and surcharges on fees (Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1993, s. 229). Finally, the Constitution provides that local government is 
entitled to an ‘equitable share’ of nationally generated revenue, providing 
municipalities with a legal claim to unconditional revenue streams (Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 227(1)(a)). It also instructs national and 
provincial governments to respect local government’s distinctiveness (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(4)). 
 
The emphasis on the distinctiveness of local government is balanced by the two 
other constitutional labels, namely the ‘interdependence’ and ‘interrelatedness’ of 
the three spheres. 
 
Local government’s interdependence in relation to other spheres of government 
connotes a relationship of supervision. National and provincial governments are 
constitutionally entitled and mandated to supervise the performance of 
municipalities. The constitutional division of functions between national 
government and provincial governments determines the extent to which either of 
them may supervise municipalities with respect to a particular functional area. A 
detailed exposition of this division goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
it is safe to say that both spheres of government exercise significant supervisory 
powers with regard to municipalities. National government establishes an 
institutional framework for local government that is largely uniform across the nine 
provinces. National and provincial governments must monitor the performance of 
municipalities so as to ensure that they discharge their developmental and service 
delivery responsibilities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 
155(6) and (7)). National and provincial governments must support local 
government (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 154). Finally, 
provincial governments have the right to intervene in the event of serious problems 
in a municipality (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 139). 
 
The ‘interrelatedness’ of local government with other spheres of government 
connotes cooperation: organs of state in the three spheres of government are 
instructed to cooperate with one another in a relationship of equality (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 41). This constitutional instruction to 
cooperate is particularly relevant in the South African context where the 
constitutional division of functions between the three spheres is not neatly defined. 
Many overlaps between national, provincial and local functions exist (Steytler and 
De Visser 2007:5-16; Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). For example, when the 
Constitution makes national and provincial governments responsible for ‘Public 
Transport’ and municipalities for ‘Municipal Public Transport’,3 it is clear that the 
‘fuzzy edges’ between municipal and provincial functions require intensive 
cooperation between the two spheres to avoid and address role confusion.  
 
A key instrument of cooperation is integrated development planning. An important 
premise of South Africa’s planning framework is that the municipality coordinates 
                                                
3
 See Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
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the planning of development and service delivery by all three spheres of 
government in its municipal area.4 Another key manifestation of the inclusion of 
local government into the broader cooperative venture is that local government is a 
partner in intergovernmental relations: through organised local government 
structures (local government associations), it is represented on most relevant 
intergovernmental structures and institutions (Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act 2005). 
 
Municipal Governance 
Effectiveness of municipal governance institutions is a precondition in order for 
any country to reap the benefits of decentralisation. Olowu and Wunsch (2004:9) 
remark that: 
 
[w]eak authority and defective institutional and operational rules can make it 
difficult to reach decisions, and thereby lead to policy failure and weakened local 
governance. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the transformation of local government governance systems 
introduced new systems of executive leadership in municipalities. These new 
systems have drastically changed the profile of a municipality and the desired 
relationship between its political and administrative components. 
 
Before 2000, the average municipality was governed by a small council with a 
weak, collective executive structure. The council was chaired by a mayor whose 
task was largely ceremonial. The municipal administration was led by a strong 
‘town clerk’ who initiated and drove much of the council agenda (Olowu and 
Wunsch 2004:89). This fitted the context of the municipality as a largely 
administrative, rather than policy making, authority. 
 
The new generation of municipalities is governed by a large council; it has a strong 
executive authority, in many cases concentrated in an executive mayor. The council 
meeting is chaired by a separately elected speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998, 
ss. 36 and 37) and the administration is headed by a municipal manager (Municipal 
Structures Act 1998, s. 55). The municipal manager is appointed by the council 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82) and is expected to work very closely 
together with the municipal executive5. The new legal framework expects 
municipalities to extend their activities beyond administering national and 
provincial laws. Municipalities must adopt policies and by-laws, actively engage 
municipal communities, plan strategically and partner with external institutions. 
This requires strong political and administrative leadership. A critical difference 
from the system that prevailed before 2000 relates to the role of the municipal 
                                                
4
 See Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act; see also below. 
5
 Municipal managers enter into a performance agreement with the mayor. See the Municipal 
Performance Regulations for Municipal Manager and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal 
Managers, 2006, GN R805, Government Gazette 29089, 1 August 2006.
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executive. The municipal executive is expected to initiate policy, oversee the 
administration and take regular executive and administrative decisions. 
 
At an administrative level, the transformation has been fundamental. The new legal 
framework has resulted in an improved and rational system for municipal 
administration. The Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act have laid down a framework for the municipal administration that 
is based on modern public management principles. Concepts such as strategic 
planning, performance measurement, modern accounting principles, transparency, 
and separation of politics from administration, resonate throughout the legal 
framework. Community participation in municipal affairs has been firmly placed 
on the municipal agenda by the adoption of a progressive framework that instructs 
municipalities to involve communities in decision-making. Best practices on how 
best to implement these directives are emerging, albeit slowly.  
 
5. Current Challenges 
Despite significant progress in the rationalisation and modernisation of municipal 
governance, there are specific challenges inherent in the new system which are 
possibly hampering the successful transformation of local government. What 
follows is a examination of some of the most pertinent institutional difficulties that 
have arisen in the first decade of democratic local government in South Africa. 
 
Size 
A significant challenge is the size of the average South Africa municipality. The 
country has 283 municipalities that serve a population of close to 48 million and 
cover a landmass of 1,220,813 square kilometres (Statistics South Africa 2007:1.1 
and 2.1). Quick comparisons with Spain (50 provinces and 8,108 municipalities), 
and Germany (323 districts and 12,477 municipalities), show that South Africa’s 
municipalities are vast in size and population. In fact, municipalities are actually 
charged with a regional mandate. Not only are municipalities slowly emerging 
from the painfully difficult amalgamation of varied previous municipal 
administrations, but the management of often very diverse communities is itself a 
difficult task. There are many examples of contestation between communities in 
single municipalities. For example, when one group of communities succeeded, 
after a protracted and sometimes violent battle, to have their municipality (called 
Merafong) incorporated into the Gauteng province, another group of communities 
in the same municipality vehemently questioned that decision. 
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the size of the South African municipality is a 
considerable challenge for that municipality when it wants to realise effective 
community participation. This challenge relates specifically to rural areas. In the 
quest for economically viable municipal units with redistributive potential, the 
norm is that a number of towns are demarcated into one municipality together with 
their rural hinterlands, which are thus very extensive and, again, often diverse in 
character. 
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As stated above, strong municipal executive leadership is a characteristic of the 
new generation of municipalities. Many municipalities have ‘executive mayors’. 
This means that municipal executive powers are concentrated in one councillor 
who is elected by the council as its executive mayor (Municipal Structures Act 
1998, ss. 55 and 56).6 The executive mayor, in turn, ‘hand picks’ a mayoral 
committee (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 60).7 This system stands in contrast 
to the conventional collective executive system that obtained in all municipalities 
prior to 2000, and which is still practiced in those municipalities that do not have 
an executive mayor. The collective executive system entails the election by the 
council of an executive committee that broadly ‘mirrors’ the composition of the 
municipal council (Municipal Structures Act 1998, ss. 43 and 44). 
 
It is suggested that the introduction of the indirectly elected executive mayor has 
been particularly successful in large cities, where it has contributed to visible 
executive leadership. In general, stakeholders appear to be “relatively satisfied with 
the system”.8 There are, however, concerns around potential exclusionary effects. 
The executive mayor system appears to have created a wide gap between executive 
councillors (i.e. councillors on the mayoral committee) and ‘ordinary’ councillors 
who are not part of the mayoral committee. These councillors feel increasingly 
disadvantaged due to the lack of access to documentation and information flows. A 
report on the functioning of the mayoral executive system remarked that: “[i]t is 
clear that the relationships between the mayoral executive committee and non-
executive councillors are not based on democratic values, but display a lack of 
transparency; autocratic decision-making; and accountability. This is expressed by 
stakeholders as a lack of respect for one another, a culture of secrecy, and 
perceptions of marginalisation.”9  
 
Role Definitions 
The issue of the division of responsibilities and powers among political office-
bearers in a municipality has proved to be a persistent source of tension and 
contestation. As stated above, the speaker’s office was a novelty when it was 
introduced in 2000. Generally, municipalities have not found it easy to adapt to this 
new political office-bearer. A persistent source of tension and conflict can be found 
in the role definition of the speaker vis-à-vis the municipal executive, or more 
specifically, the mayor. An earlier study found the relationship between speakers 
and executive mayors to be poor: “Self-defeating patterns of behaviour characterise 
interaction between the executive mayor and the speaker. Both act in a way that is 
detrimental to themselves and the municipality and there is little understanding and 
                                                
6
 See further Steytler and De Visser 3-29ff. 
7
 
See DA v Masondo 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC) for a Constitutional Court judgment on the 
composition of mayoral committees. See also Wooldridge 2008:478. 
8
 
See Idasa, paragraph 9. 
9
 See Idasa, section 3; See also Atkinson 2007:64. 
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concern about the consequences of the poor relationship between them and the 
negative impact this has on the municipality.”10 
 
The constitutional reality that the municipal council possesses both legislative and 
executive authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(2)) 
sets the scene for a possibly uneasy relationship between the speaker and the 
municipal executive. South Africa’s national and provincial parliaments are 
configured in a Westminster style. Their speakers are responsible for managing the 
affairs of the legislature: they generally have no authority over the affairs of the 
executive save for the occasion when its members participate in the legislature. In 
contrast, the speaker in a municipality occupies a different role, simply because the 
municipal council is not a body that is exclusively tasked with passing laws and 
overseeing the executive. It is also tasked with discussing and disposing of a range 
of executive and administrative issues. The mere fact that the municipal speaker 
presides over and participates in meetings where administrative and executive 
issues are debated and discussed, calls for a more nuanced role definition. 
 
In terms of statutory law, the municipal speaker is at a minimum responsible for 
chairing council meetings and enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors 
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37). However, additional powers may be 
delegated to the speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37(b)). It is common 
practice for the council to delegate to the speaker responsibilities related to 
community participation and councillor support. However, both these functional 
areas attract a great deal of politics. The engagement of municipal office-bearers 
with the municipal community is an intensely political activity where the municipal 
executive is involved. At times, speakers do not limit themselves to organising and 
guarding the quality of the community engagement. They then become active 
participants, often to the chagrin of the municipal executive. Similarly, councillor 
support may become an arena for ‘petty politics’ in the council. Unfortunately, the 
power to decide who is entitled to training, conference visits and other types of 
councillor support often represents political leverage. The mayor may seek to 
preserve control over this.  
 
Mostly, tensions arise from an unclear definition of roles. By law, municipalities 
must define the roles and responsibilities in written ‘terms of reference’ for each 
political office-bearer, and provide for internal conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Research indicates that most municipalities have not adopted such ‘job 
descriptions’ for their speakers and do not have standing procedures for resolving 
these possibly debilitating conflicts (De Visser, Baatjies and Akintan 2008).   
 
Council Appointees 
As stated earlier, the role of the most senior municipal official, now called the 
municipal manager, has changed significantly. Since 2000, the municipal council 
has had the authority to appoint the municipal manager as well as those managers 
                                                
10
 See Idasa , section 2. 
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that report directly to him or her (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82; Municipal 
Systems Act 2000, s. 56). This configuration was designed to produce a senior 
management team in the municipality that understands, and operates in sync with 
its political principals in the municipal executive. Whilst this objective is 
supported, there appear to be a number of important side-effects. Firstly, political 
instability in a municipal council now has an immediate ‘knock-on’ effect on 
senior management. A change in local political leadership, shifts in a ruling 
coalition, or even a reform within a ruling party, often leads to the dismissal of the 
municipal manager and sometimes even to the dismissal of managers reporting to 
the municipal manager (Wooldridge 2008:475). This is evidenced by the large 
number of unfilled vacancies in the top two echelons of municipal administration. 
In 2006 and 2007, 15% of the posts in senior municipal management stood vacant 
(National Treasury 2008:184). Municipal administrations are thus suffering from a 
lack of continuity at senior management level (Municipal Demarcation Board 
2007:89). 
 
Secondly, the highly charged political profile of these positions has contributed to a 
shift in control over appointments from the municipal council to the internal 
workings of political parties. There is widespread concern that the need for 
‘political suitability’ is starting to eclipse the need for qualified and skilled senior 
managers in the municipality (Atkinson 2007:67). The fact that 30% or more of 
senior municipal management has five years or less local government experience 
reveals a disconcerting trend towards the appointment of inadequately skilled 
senior managers.11 It is suggested that this is partly the result of excessive political 
involvement in what should be appointments on the basis of merit. In order for 
local government to further improve its performance, a new balance needs to be 
struck between the need for political alignment of top management with the 
municipal executive on the one hand, and an insistence on quality on the other. 
Serious consideration should be given to removing the appointment of the second 
layer of management from the realm of the municipal council and leaving this to 
the municipal manager. It is suggested that this will assist in reducing political 
involvement in the administration, whilst leaving the political alignment between 
the municipal manager and the municipal executive intact. 
 
Improving Community Participation 
The involvement of communities in municipal affairs is not only a key objective of 
local government but also one of the main reasons for South Africa’s choice of 
developmental local government. Success is this area is thus of paramount 
importance. Government’s recognition of this importance is evidenced by an 
elaborate and progressive legal framework for participatory governance at 
municipal level.  
 
Municipalities are tasked to involve communities in the drafting of their integrated 
development plan, their budget, and in the taking of decisions regarding service 
                                                
11
 See Municipal Demarcation Board 2007:88; SALGA 2007:59; National Treasury 2008:185. 
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delivery and development. Furthermore, the law contains a legal framework for 
ward committees. These committees generally comprise ten representatives of 
various sectors or geographical areas in the ward. They are elected by the voters in 
the ward. The committee is chaired by the ward councillor. Its role is to advance 
participation of the community in the affairs of the municipality, particularly in 
relation to development planning. The concept of a ward committee follows similar 
practices elsewhere, such as the village development committees in Botswana 
(Serema 2002:1). 
 
However, an apparent contradiction exists between the progressive legal 
framework for community participation and persistent incidences of protest 
targeting councillors and municipal administrations.12 Although government has 
created ample spaces, platforms and procedures for community engagement with 
local government, it is clear that communities still elect to take their grievances to 
the streets. These protests expose not only the current shortcomings in service 
delivery but also the presence of untapped local energy and involvement with 
municipal governance. Atkinson suggests that the frustrations of communities are 
threefold. They relate to poor service delivery, unresponsive decision-making and 
conspicuous consumption by councillors and officials (Atkinson 2007:58).  
 
There are many underlying reasons for the protests that are not always within the 
realm of what municipalities are responsible for, and an extended discussion of 
these tensions falls outside of the scope of this paper. However, a general 
observation relates to the wisdom of institutionalising community participation. 
The legal framework impacting on municipal governance is awash with 
institutions, procedures and platforms that are used to capture diverse interests and 
channel them into a discourse to which a municipal bureaucracy can relate. The 
danger that lurks in the creation and nurturing of institutionalised forms of public 
participation such as ward committees, is that it removes the imperative to 
continuously look for innovative ways to engage communities. There may be good 
reason to revisit this approach and seek more insights into how communities really 
wish to relate to municipal administrations. This observation does not detract from 
the potential that local government has for deepening community participation or 
from the noble intentions behind the current legal framework. It rather emphasises 
the need for adequate strategies at municipal level for translating this potential and 
the enabling framework into genuine engagement. 
 
6. Intergovernmental Framework: A New Role for Cities? 
Central to many of the problems besetting local government is the lack of clarity 
with regards to the intergovernmental framework. The Constitution combines a 
strong expression of autonomy for municipalities with a weak definition of the 
areas that they are responsible for. The precise demarcation of the functional 
responsibility of a municipality is dependent on a variety of processes and 
                                                
12
 For an overview of the scale of protests, see Atkinson 2007:54; SALGA 2007:139; Mathekga and 
Buccus  2006. 
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interventions, such as functional definitions in statutes, the outcome of judicial 
proceedings solving disputes over who does what, or the conclusion of 
intergovernmental agreements and protocols (Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). The 
uncertainty over functional areas renders it difficult for municipalities to plan and 
budget for current and capital expenditure (National Treasury 2008:152). There is a 
perception that the goal posts are changing continuously (Atkinson 2007:71). The 
challenges pertaining to the mismatch between the constitutional allocation of 
powers and the realities of the developmental mandate are traversed in another 
contribution to this journal (Christmas and De Visser 2009). 
 
It may be argued that an insistence on a clear demarcation of functional local 
government responsibilities is naïve, that the complexities of governance cannot be 
confined to legal definitions, and that flexible governance arrangements are more 
important. However, three reasons are proffered for greater clarity. Firstly, the 
constitutional context in South Africa gives rise to an expectation surrounding 
clarity of responsibilities. If the Constitution itself puts forward a list of functional 
areas and seeks to protect municipal discretion with regard to these areas, there is 
an expectation that these constitutional prescripts should be given a reasonably 
precise meaning. It would not be in keeping with the constitutional promise of 
autonomy if the Constitution contains a list of functional areas but then the content 
of these areas is actually immaterial, and that flexible governance arrangements are 
considered more pressing than giving effect to constitutional provisions.  
 
Secondly, flexible governance arrangements are likely to work better in countries 
with strong municipal governments and a long history of decentralisation. In such a 
context, municipalities will enter these governance partnerships as equal partners. 
But in countries such as South Africa, where decentralisation is a new 
phenomenon, municipalities (with the exception of strong metropolitan 
municipalities) are underdogs in negotiations with strong provincial or national 
government departments. A reasonably clear understanding of the content of the 
functional areas equips municipalities to enter negotiations surrounding the fuzzy 
edges as equal partners.  
 
Lastly, the uncertainty surrounding functional responsibilities is undermining the 
legitimacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In South Africa, fiscal 
arrangements and calculations are premised on an understanding of constitutional 
mandates. If this understanding is contested at a fundamental level, the integrity of 
the intergovernmental fiscal system is endangered. 
 
Role of Big Cities 
An example of incoherence in the intergovernmental framework that should impel 
law and policy makers to reflect on the adequacy of the institutional and policy 
environment for local government, relates to the role of big cities. A concern for 
more coherence in the institutions of local government and the powers it possesses 
should not be misunderstood as a drive for uniformity. In fact, the imposition of 
uniformity on an unequal environment produces a lack of coherence. It is argued 
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that this type of incoherence may be emerging in the system of local government. 
Despite having a dedicated institutional arrangement for metropolitan areas in the 
form of single tiered metropolitan municipalities, the local government system pays 
too little regard to the variations in challenges, capacity and progress between areas 
(Cities Network 2006:2-28; Van Ryneveld 2007). There are two bases for this 
concern. The first relates to the fundamental economic importance of large cities. 
 
• The majority of South Africans now live in cities and large towns and this 
figure is generally on the rise. In 2006, 42 percent of the national 
population lived in the 21 biggest cities and towns that cover just 2 per cent 
of the South African land surface.  
• The majority of wealth is created in urban areas. The 21 biggest cities and 
towns together contribute 70 per cent of the national General Value Added 
(GVA). 
• The 21 biggest cities and towns are also home to 25 per cent of persons 
living below the breadline (Cities Network 2006:2-12). 
 
The second basis for concern relates to the fact that this concentration of both 
economic activity and poverty in urban areas requires specific, specialised 
approaches to issues such as: 
 
• Dealing with the informal economic activity and settlements; and 
• Planning and implementing in an integrated manner around typical urban 
governance issues, such as housing, transport and infrastructure. 
 
South Africa’s biggest cities are consistently appealing to provincial and national 
governments, with varying success, to consider the devolution of certain critical 
functions. The Constitution itself permits and envisages an ‘asymmetrical’ 
approach to municipal powers by providing for individual assignments, that is the 
transfer of authority to individual municipalities (Steytler and De Visser 2007:5-
39). To date, this instrument has not been used to empower big cities with authority 
that goes beyond their ‘original’ functions. In reality, however, big cities perform a 
myriad of additional functions, on behalf of or in partnership with organs of state in 
other spheres of government. These are often based on fluid, informal or 
contractual arrangements.  
 
Critical areas that have been consistently identified as being in need of a 
differentiated approach include housing and transport (SALGA 2007:103,108). 
Authority over housing, and the entitlement to the intergovernmental finances for 
housing development, is with the provincial governments. However, the 
eradication of slums and inadequate shelter through the provision of low cost 
housing is without doubt a key priority of cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town 
and eThekwini (Durban). Similarly, the redesign and upgrade of South Africa’s 
appalling public transport system, historically designed to accommodate the 
transfer of the black labour force into city centres and white suburbs, is a top 
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concern of the cities. Yet, cities have little authority over public transport matters 
(National Treasury 2008:153). 
 
It is suggested that this lack of authority compromises cities’ ability to ensure an 
integrated approach to the provision of housing and the upgrading of public 
transport facilities in an environmentally sustainable manner. There is no doubt 
that, through innovative and cooperative arrangements at a regional and provincial 
level, much can be achieved without resorting to changing the formal division of 
powers (National Treasury 2008:153). However, it is submitted that the devolution 
of housing and public transport authority to South Africa’s cities would contribute 
to the acceleration of delivery in these areas. The same does not apply to smaller 
towns and rural municipalities: in that case, different public transport needs, 
economies of scale and capacity constraints render it necessary for housing and 
public transport authority to be exercised at a higher level than the municipality.  
 
7. Integrated Development Planning: Towards Selective Alignment? 
The legal and policy framework for development planning in South Africa 
envisages that municipalities will play an absolutely essential role in realising 
coherent planning across the three spheres of government. Each municipality is 
required by law to adopt an integrated development plan (IDP). The IDP must be 
adopted shortly after the beginning of a municipal council’s term. Furthermore, it 
must be reviewed annually. It is the municipality’s strategic plan that is based on an 
intensive community participation process to gauge and prioritise the municipal 
community’s needs. The IDP is expected to integrate the planning of all municipal 
departments under the umbrella of a united strategy for the municipal area. 
Importantly, the IDP must go beyond planning rhetoric and be the basis for the 
municipality’s annual budgets and its spatial planning. Furthermore, the 
municipality’s senior managers must be held accountable regularly, through a 
system of performance management, for the realisation of the IDP. As if this 
configuration is not sufficiently ambitious, the IDP is expected to integrate not only 
the municipality’s plans but also the plans of all national and provincial 
departments and parastatals (such as electricity-generating and telecommunication 
utilities) in that municipal area (Department of Constitutional Development 
1998:19) 
 
There is no doubt that the introduction of integrated development planning has 
forced municipalities to engage communities and gauge and prioritise their needs. 
It has also propelled municipalities into a thinking that goes beyond the municipal 
council’s term, and into a concerted effort at integrating service delivery and 
development across spheres, sectors and actors. 
 
In this framework, the municipality is expected to be the pivot that skilfully 
mediates the tremendous and varied needs of a municipal community with the 
requirements of departments and parastatals in two other spheres of government 
(Patel and Powell 2008:353). All of this is to be done within the parameters of a 
tight municipal budget. When the municipal capacity is set off against these 
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expectations, however, the picture looks bleak for many municipal areas. Capacity 
for integrated development planning at municipal level is low. The dependency on 
consultants to realise an IDP is staggering. A recent report suggests that 28% of 
local municipalities lack the most basic capacity to prepare an IDP and will 
struggle even with additional support. Only one in three (37%) municipalities has 
independent capacity to prepare an IDP, whilst another 35% have some basic 
capacity and can prepare an IDP with additional support (Good Governance 
Learning Network 2008:51). Against the backdrop of these figures, the assignment 
to municipalities to be the coordinator of all of government’s development efforts 
in the municipal area may be a tall order for some time to come. Thus when they 
reflect on the municipality’s role in intergovernmental planning, Pieterse and Van 
Donk remark that: “it is unlikely that municipalities will have the political clout (let 
alone the institutional capabilities) to persuade a national department to delay or 
redefine its particular programmes.” (Pieterse and Van Donk 2008:62) 
 
The intergovernmental aspiration, embedded in the planning framework, which 
envisages the IDP to be a reflection of the entire government’s vision for the 
municipal area, may be an ambitious attempt at cooperative planning across the 
three spheres. However, the insistence on this wholesale alignment of municipal 
budgets and plans with national and provincial budgets and plans may also just be 
an offshoot of the distrust of municipalities as the custodians of local development. 
There is no doubt that pervasive trends of corruption, mismanagement, immature 
politics and a skills deficit in many municipalities do little to dispel this distrust. 
However, the solution that is now imposed through legislation is, by all accounts, 
extremely difficult to achieve and harbours significant dangers for the achievement 
of bottom-up development.  
 
The IDP has become a tightly regulated process that must absorb the input of a 
multitude of development actors towards the adoption of a document within tight 
deadlines. This process has thus become a ‘pressure cooker’, which is incompatible 
with unwieldy community input which tends to disrupt intergovernmental cohesion 
and adherence to the intergovernmental deadlines (Good Governance Learning 
Network 2008:52). There is then a real danger that communities and community 
organisations will become disgruntled with the IDP, as they perceive the process to 
be inadequate in responding to their needs. A more realistic approach to 
intergovernmental planning and alignment may be apposite. It may be worthwhile 
to consider the identification of a limited number of national key priorities and 
insist on their alignment, whilst relaxing the effort towards synchronisation on 
other, less important policy areas. This may provide the necessary room for 
municipalities to develop their planning capabilities, devise mechanisms for 
genuine interaction with communities, and display creativity. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The progress made by South African municipalities towards realising the vision of 
developmental local government is remarkable and unprecedented. Over the last 13 
years, municipalities have embarked on the extension of infrastructure and 
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development, whilst absorbing changes to their internal governance and 
management arrangements, financial management systems and intergovernmental 
responsibilities. The new local government system thus offers great potential for 
the realisation of a better life for all citizens, facilitated by a new generation of 
developmentally oriented municipalities. 
 
However, this paper has identified several areas of contestation and conflict that 
impede service delivery and development. It has argued that an improvement in 
municipal governance is essential, and has identified key questions around 
governance arrangements and community participation. It has also proposed that 
municipal service delivery would benefit from more institutional coherence and 
predictability. An example given relates to the need for institutional 
accommodation of different spatial and economic realities that obtain in big cities. 
The paper also looked at the ambitious and progressive framework for integrated 
development planning and asked whether the insistence on comprehensive policy 
alignment should not be substituted with a policy of selective alignment around 
national key priority areas. 
 
Thus it cannot be assumed that communities will start reaping more benefits from 
the developmental system of local government. Municipalities operate in a 
complex system of intergovernmental relations, which places a high premium on 
both local discretion and intergovernmental integration. Capacity constraints in 
critical areas of municipal governance and administration are hampering service 
delivery. There is also a lack of connectivity between communities and 
municipalities, which flies in the face of the policy intent of ‘developmental local 
government’. The search for the right balance is far from over. 
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